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Chinese Intellectuals and the Problem of Xinjiang 
March 9, 2009 in In Case You Missed It by The China Beat | 2 comments 
Review of Wang Lixiong: Wo de Xiyu, ni de Dongtu, Taipei, Dakuai wenhua (Locus Publishing), 2007, 
472 pp. 
By Sebastian Veg 
It is a common assumption that Chinese intellectuals, however critical of their government, its 
institutions, and its policies, are unreceptive to calls for greater self-government, much less 
independence, in China’s autonomous regions, most notably Tibet and Xinjiang. It is therefore worth 
taking note of Wang Lixiong’s book on Xinjiang, published in 2007 in Taiwan, the title of which can be 
rendered as My Far West, Your East Turkistan. 
Wang Lixiong is no newcomer to the question, having devoted the past two decades to researching 
and reflecting on the place of “ethnic minorities” in China’s political system, in particular in view of its 
possible democratization. Born in 1953, Wang took part in the Democracy Wall movement in 1978 
and, in the aftermath of 1989, published the “political fantasy” novel Huang Huo (Yellow 
Peril or Yellow Disaster) under the name Baomi (1991; an English translation was published asChina 
Tidal Wave, translated by Matthew Dillon, Hawaii UP, 2007). In the 1990s, he began researching and 
writing a book-length study of Tibet, published in 1998 under the title Sky Burial: The Fate of 
Tibet (Tianzang: Xizang de mingyun), and resigned from the Writers’ Association in 2001. In a follow-
up to the book, he met the Dalai Lama (in the United States) for a series of talks, published in 2002 
under the title Dialogue with the Dalai Lama (Yu Dalai Lama duihua). 
 
Wang Lixiong and the Dalai Lama 
 
Wang Lixiong first began to study Xinjiang in 1999, when he travelled there to prepare research for a 
book along the lines of Sky Burial. He was arrested for photocopying an internal publication, stamped 
as “secret,” on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (the notorious bingtuan), and 
attempted suicide in a high-security prison in Miquan before recanting and promising to collaborate in 
order to obtain his release. He recorded the incident in a short essay entitled Memories of 
Xinjiang (Xinjiang zhuiji), published in 2001 and reprinted as an introduction to the present volume. In 
prison, he shared a cell with a Han prisoner accused of economic crimes (“Uncle Chen”), and a Uyghur 
prisoner arrested in Beijing for organizing a demonstration protesting discrimination (Mokhtar), with 
whom he entered into a long and ongoing discussion on Xinjiang that forms the backbone of the book. 
In the form of memories of prison conversations with Mokhtar, Wang Lixiong sketches out a 
preliminary analysis of the “Xinjiang problem,” which he believes has entered a phase of 
“Palestinization.” He begins with some anecdotal examples of what he calls the Han “colonial attitude,” 
citing the resistance to “Urumchi time”[1] among local Hans, and their worship of Wang Zhen (1908-
1993), Party secretary of Xinjiang from 1949 to 1955.[2] 
While in Mao’s times all “nationalities” were submitted to equal oppression, Wang concludes that since 
the 1990s, which he isolates as a turning point, Uyghurs feel they have not benefited from the same 
treatment as the Han. After 1989, the Center adopted a “nip all destabilizing elements in the bud” 
policy (Ba yiqie bu wending de yinsu xiaomie zai mengya zhuangtai, p. 66), and increasingly resorted 
to pan-Chinese nationalism, strengthening the sympathies of Xinjiang’s Han population, but 
increasingly alienating Uyghurs. Wang writes: 
I have always been surprised at the government’s wishful thinking in believing it could merge China’s 
56 nationalities into one under the artificial concept of “the Chinese nation” [Zhonghua minzu], and 
make them face the outside world with an identical outlook. (…) On the contrary, each nationality can 
also use nationalism for its own goals, strengthen its internal cohesion through nationalism, and 
justify separatism and independence in its name.” (p. 59-60) 
Wang shares the view of a nationalist or at least cultural-nationalist revival in Chinese political 
discourse, initiated by Deng Xiaoping and reinforced after 1989. One may note that the main themes 
of this discourse (five thousand years of history, the “humiliation” of the Opium War and imperialism, 
anti-Japanese feelings) are not particularly conducive to appropriation by other ethnic groups, and 
indeed are sometimes downright detrimental (e.g., the emphasis on the Qing empire and the 
civilisation it purportedly brought to frontier regions such as Xinjiang). 
In this sense, Wang believes that the “Xinjiang problem” is largely a self-fulfilling prophecy” (p. 61) in 
which an important role was played by the famous yet still mysterious “Document No. 7” issued in 
March 1996, the first to conflate separatism with “illegal religious activity.” In this situation of mutual 
distrust, all efforts to stimulate the economy, no matter how profitable, were inevitably seen as 
colonialism. And in fact, Wang concludes that Han inhabitants of Xinjiang were able to reap an 
overwhelming share of the benefits. New Han farmers took over the land from Uyghur farmers, 
effectively colonizing Xinjiang’s agriculture. From 1990 to 2000, according to official statistics, the Han 
population in Xinjiang increased by 1.8 million people, or over 30 percent. 
This introduction is followed by three other substantial sections. The first is a travelogue of Wang’s 
four subsequent trips to Xinjiang between 2003 and 2006. It is followed by another long dialogue 
between Wang and Mokhtar. The final part is comprised of three “Letters to Mokhtar,” which conclude 
the conversation and sum up Wang’s main points regarding the difficulties of Xinjiang independence. 
Wang Lixiong does not write as an academic, nor does he give much background, even of a 
journalistic nature, but draws only on his conversations with various people in Xinjiang. Although 
somewhat problematic, this no doubt makes his findings more accessible to ordinary readers, and 
more plausible to Chinese readers who are not knowledgeable on the subject. 
He thus reports with considerable first-hand detail on deepening urban segregation and growing 
nepotism and corruption, highlighting the monopoly on mineral water held by Party Secretary Wang 
Lequan’s[3] son-in-law. He then goes on to highlight three main aspects of Xinjiang’s socio-political 
system: the colonial economy and control of resources by Han officials (in particular within the 
bingtuan system), the education system, and more generally the politics of cultural uniformization, 
concluding that government policy on Xinjiang requires urgent revision. 
Part 1 of 2. 
The full text of this review essay is published in China Perspectives, 2008.4. 
 
[1] In 1980, the Xinjiang People’s Congress decided to switch to “Urumchi time,” two hours behind 
Beijing time, but abandoned the idea in the face of resistance by local Hans. 
[2] When Wang Zhen, State Vice-President and one of the “Eight Immortals” (influential in the 1989 
crackdown) died, his ashes were scattered in the Tianshan mountains in accordance with his wishes. 
Uyghurs manifested their outrage by refusing to drink water from the Tianshan, which they believed 
had been sullied. 
[3] Politburo member Wang Lequan became deputy Party secretary for Xinjiang in 1992 and acting 
secretary in 1994, and has served as full Secretary since 1995, in violation of the official policy to 
rotate provincial secretaries at least every ten years. 
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